Shared scepticism, different motives:
Franco-German perceptions of a common
European safe asset. Bertelsmann Stiftung 26 October 2018 by Best, Kris
26 OktOber 2018
#eMU 
#financialstability
#Marketdiscipline
▪ kris best
Guest Author,  
Jacques Delors Institute 
Berlin 
shared scepticisM, different MOtives: 
francO-GerMan perceptiOns Of a cOMMOn 
eUrOpean safe asset
executive summary
A common European safe asset is a highly contentious proposal within the Euro area reform 
agenda. Various safe asset proposals have been put forward since the onset of the Euro crisis 
ranging from Eurobonds to European Safe Bonds (ESBies), also known as Sovereign Bond-
Backed Securities (SBBS), which currently enjoy the institutional support of the European 
Commission as well as the High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets at the European Systemic 
Risk Board. Its proponents argue that a European safe asset is required to break the bank-sov-
ereign nexus and limit destabilising capital flows, ultimately improving financial stability in the 
Euro area. Nevertheless, the concept of a European safe asset remains controversial among 
national policymakers; some consider the idea promising, while others see it as a threat to 
market discipline, national sovereignty, or long-term fiscal stability.
In a joint declaration made in June 2018, France and Germany strongly rejected the SBBS 
proposal, claiming that it presented more disadvantages than benefits. Beneath this superfi-
cial agreement, however, a deeper investigation into the safe asset debate in both countries 
reveals considerable differences in how policymakers engage with safe asset proposals, as-
sess the costs and benefits, and set conditions for its acceptability. These are rooted in more 
fundamental differences between the two countries in beliefs, values, and interests linked to 
economic policy. Broadly, while the French debate is heterogenous, technical, and focused on 
assessing the present effectiveness of a safe asset in improving Euro area financial stability, 
the approach in Germany is more uniform, straightforward, and focused on avoiding moral 
hazard and other long-term risks. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the French posi-
tion on safe assets has moved closer to the German position over time. 
Although the safe asset debate is likely to endure past the Franco-German rejection, the pres-
ent investigation shows that there are key questions, political as well as technical, which re-
main to be resolved with any safe asset proposal. At least as far as the debate in France and 
Germany is concerned, the main points of contention both between and within the two coun-
tries concern the degree of joint liability that would be acceptable or necessary for the propos-
al to work, the regulatory treatment of the safe asset and of sovereign exposures in general, 
and the appropriate design of the asset to preserve market discipline. 
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intrOdUctiOn
Safe assets as an element of the Euro area reform agenda have seen a resurgence of interest 
in the last few years, notably through the work of the European Systemic Risk Board’s (ESRB) 
High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets, which presented its findings in early 2018.1 Neverthe-
less, a common European safe asset is one of the more contested elements of this agenda: 
while many economists consider that it could deliver substantial macroeconomic benefits, 
others are just as convinced that ‘safe’ asset proposals are unneeded at best and a threat to 
the financial stability of the Euro area at worst. This is particularly true of the Sovereign Bond-
Backed Securities (SBBS) proposal endorsed by the ESRB’s High-Level Task Force, which has 
proven to be highly controversial among national policymakers, especially in France and Ger-
many, the Euro area’s largest economies and so-called historical ‘motor’.
Since the 2017 French presidential election, the Macron administration has pushed to reinvig-
orate the long-standing partnership between France and Germany and to put forward a joint 
proposal for further Euro area reform. In June 2018, a joint declaration and roadmap were pro-
posed at Meseberg, outlining the key elements of the Franco-German agenda – and rejecting 
the possibility of introducing SBBS, the most prominent safe asset proposal in recent years. A 
deeper investigation into why that is the case is not only useful in understanding the thinking 
behind the economic policy decisions of the Euro area’s two most influential members, but 
also casts light on more fundamental divisions in economic perspectives or worldviews which 
have shaped the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception and continue to 
define debates over the future of the Euro area.
This policy paper explains the concept and policy rationale of a common European safe as-
set and explores how the various proposals – from Eurobonds to SBBS – have evolved with 
the debate over time, emphasising the critical issues and points of contention. It then shows 
how the safe asset debate is viewed differently in France and Germany based on research 
interviews conducted with 21 high-level policymakers and academic experts representing the 
key economic, fiscal, and monetary institutions in both countries. It presents a framework for 
understanding Franco-German economic policy disagreements, identifies the principle areas 
of disagreement, and describes how these two approaches work together in practice.
1. ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets (HLTF), ‘Report of the High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets Volumes I & II’,  
January 2018. 
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1 ▪ safe assets: an explainer
1.1 definition of a safe asset
In general terms, a safe asset is a tradeable financial asset, usually a sovereign bond, which 
is widely perceived to have a low or non-existent risk of default – that is, the asset is widely 
perceived by market actors to be safe. A safe asset also has certain attributes which are highly 
desirable in financial markets. Namely, a safe asset:
•  Is extremely liquid with a deep market, to the point of being a de facto cash-equivalent;
• Has a stable market, with exceptionally low volatility in price;
•  Is information insensitive, in that it can be accepted at face value without the need to 
gather additional information about its riskiness.
As safe assets are highly liquid and provide a dependable store of value, they serve a number 
of important functions in financial markets. For example: 
•  Institutional investors such as pension funds invest a large amount of their capital in 
safe assets due to their perceived safety and stability; 
•  Banks and other financial institutions aim to hold a certain amount of safe assets in 
their portfolio to improve their capital position and to meet regulatory requirements 
(i.e., by creating a buffer against potential losses); 
•  Banks hold safe assets to ensure an adequate liquidity coverage ratio (i.e., ensuring 
that the bank has enough high-quality liquid assets at its disposal to cover outflows 
in a temporary liquidity crunch);
•  Safe assets are key sources of collateral needed for banks to access credit through 
the Eurosystem, or to conduct short-term repo transactions between commercial 
banks; and
•  Within a given domestic economy, the yield curve on safe assets acts as a bench-
mark from which to determine the appropriate risk premium on other assets.
One of the more interesting characteristics of a safe asset, deriving directly from its perceived 
safety, is that the safe asset will actually increase in value during periods of financial instability, 
at a time when the prices of other assets are falling. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon re-
sults from the ‘flight to safety’ that occurs as investors search for a ‘safe haven’ in which to store 
their capital; a safe asset has therefore been described as a ‘good friend’ which can be relied 
upon in difficult times.2 The fact that a safe asset will not only maintain but actually increase in 
value during a crisis allows the issuer (e.g. a government) to benefit from a ‘safe haven’ liquidity 
premium (e.g. guaranteed access to financial markets at preferential borrowing rates), which 
may be substantial. The safe haven premium on US Treasury bonds, for example, which are 
2. Brunnermeier, Markus, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau, ‘The Euro and the Battle of Ideas’  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 182. 
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considered to be the world’s leading safe asset, has been estimated at between 26 and 72 basis 
points – saving the United States an estimated 0.25% of GDP per year in interest costs.3
1.2 policy rationale as an element of euro area reform
Sovereign debt is the primary safe asset in most national economies. Three factors play a role 
in the perception of sovereign bonds as inherently safer than other domestic assets such as 
corporate or local government debt, namely that the sovereign:
•  Has revenue-raising capabilities above and beyond those of other actors, including 
the ability to tax its own citizens and borrow internationally;
•  Tends to enjoy de facto control over its domestic currency; and
•  Has access to the domestic central bank as a lender of last resort.
Through requiring Euro area members to giving up their domestic currencies and access to a 
domestic lender of last resort, the nature of the EMU removes the second and third sources of 
safety for Euro area states and significantly constrains the first with respect to debt issuance. 
Some economists have therefore argued that the structure of the EMU has reduced much of 
the sovereign debt in the Euro area to a ‘semi-safe’ status which cannot hold up in a financial 
crisis, leaving German government bonds as the only truly safe asset in the Euro area.4 This 
interpretation would be consistent with the observed yields on 10-year Euro area sovereign 
bonds, which converged around the German bund (10-year bond) with the introduction of the 
Euro, diverged considerably at the onset of the Euro crisis, and have since returned to limited 
convergence with the German bund after 2012 (Figure 1). 
fiGUre 1 ▪ interest rates on 10-year euro area government bonds, 1993–2018.
Source: European Central Bank, Interest rate statistics (2004 EU Member States & ACCBs), Long-term interest rate for convergence purposes.
3. Krishnamurthy, Arvind, and Annette Jorgensen, ‘The Aggregate demand for Treasury debt’, Journal of Political Economy, 120 (2012), 
233–67. 
4. Brunnermeier et al., 2016; van Riet, Ad, ‘Addressing the Safety Trilemma: A Safe Sovereign Asset for the Eurozone’, ESRB, 2017 
THE STRUcTURE oF THE 
EMU HAS REdUcEd MUcH 
oF THE SoVEREIgN dEBT 
oF THE EURo AREA To A 
'SEMI-SAFE' STATUS
“
6 / 22
Illustrating the defining characteristic of a safe asset, namely that it increases in value in peri-
ods of economic instability while other asset prices fall, Figure 1 also shows that yields on the 
German bund – as well as similar ‘safer’ assets such as Dutch and Luxembourgish bonds – 
did in fact decrease after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. This reflects an in-
crease in the value of the bund as investors fled from riskier assets (e.g. Greek, Spanish, or 
Portuguese bonds) into the ‘safe haven’ of Germany and similar countries. As the issuer of the 
dominant safe asset in the Euro area, Germany (and the other ‘safer’ countries) has therefore 
been able to benefit from a sizeable economic rent in the form of lower borrowing costs, even, 
or rather especially, at the height of the Euro crisis.
Since the onset of the Euro crisis, several different arguments have been put forward by econ-
omists in favour of introducing a common safe asset at the European level which would re-
place the bund as a ‘safe haven’ and benchmark asset and fill the same essential financial 
market functions that national sovereign bonds do today, i.e. acting as a dependable source of 
value to meet liquidity needs, collateral needs or regulatory requirements. Although the precise 
benefits expected from such an asset depend to some extent on its design, the proponents 
of a common European safe asset tend to centre on two fundamental arguments which are 
common to almost all proposals:
• ImprovingEuroareafinancialstability by limiting destabilising capital flows; and
•  Breaking the bank-sovereign nexus by limiting domestic bias in bank portfolios.
The first argument relates to the ‘flight to safety’ phenomenon described above, in which in-
vestors tend to invest in higher-yield riskier countries during good times but shift their capital 
into lower-yield safe assets in safer countries during bad times. The result is a sharp reversal 
in capital flows which further increases financial instability and leads to greater fragmenta-
tion in national bond markets, as demonstrated in Figure 1 above – a problem which is then 
aggravated in a common currency area by the perceived ‘quasi-safe’ (i.e. not truly safe) status 
of Euro area sovereign debt as well as the loss of the exchange rate mechanism as a tool for 
macroeconomic adjustment. It has therefore been argued that a common European safe as-
set which brings together the sovereign debt of Euro area Member States in some form would 
ensure that the ‘flight to safety’ response of investors would not result in large capital flows 
from one country to another, but rather into a common asset that would prevent further frag-
mentation in the market for sovereign debt and ensure that crisis-stricken countries maintain 
access to a stable and low-cost source of financing.5 
The second argument addresses the bank-sovereign nexus, also referred to as the bank-sover-
eign ‘doom loop’. Banks tend to exhibit a domestic bias, meaning that they hold large amounts 
of their own government’s debt. This tendency is further encouraged by current EU banking 
regulations, which assign a zero risk weight to all EU sovereign debt when calculating capital 
requirements regardless of how risky the debt may actually be, providing regulatory incentives 
for banks in riskier countries to accumulate domestic sovereign bonds beyond a risk-optimal 
level (see box below). 
5. Brunnermeier, Markus, Sam Langfield, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Dimitri Vayanos, ESBies:  
‘Safety in the Tranches’, ESRB, 2017; claessens et al., 2012; van Riet, 2017.
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European banking regulations and the zero risk weight for sovereign exposures
Under the international Basel II framework, assets held by banks are assigned 
‘risk weights’ which determine the amount of equity capital that the bank is 
required to hold against potential losses. The Basel framework assigns a risk 
weight of zero to sovereign bonds with a credit rating of AA- and above, indicating 
that these assets are considered to have the lowest possible risk of default and 
that no equity needs to be set aside against that exposure (i.e., freeing up equity 
that can then be used to fund other, riskier assets). While Basel applies positive 
risk weights to all sovereign debt rated below AA-, an exemption in the framework 
allows countries to set lower risk weights (including zero risk weights) for their 
own sovereign bonds issued in the domestic currency.6 This exemption is used 
in the European Capital Requirements Regulation to set an area-wide zero risk 
weight for sovereign bonds issued by the central governments of all EU Member 
States, regardless of their actual credit rating or riskiness. Since the Regulation 
treats sovereign bonds from all EU countries as if they were equally safe, banks 
have an incentive to hold larger amounts of riskier, higher-yield EU sovereign debt 
than would otherwise be optimal. This is particularly destabilising in combination 
with the domestic bias phenomenon.7
In this context, if the credit risk of the government increases and investors fear a possible 
default, the value of its sovereign bonds will fall, which in turn lowers the value of the assets 
held by domestic banks (since they hold large stocks of government debt) and weakens their 
capital position. If the capital position of domestic banks declines to the extent that their sol-
vency comes into question and a government bailout is expected, investors may doubt the al-
ready-stressed government’s ability to pay and divest further, causing bond values to sink even 
lower and concerns over the solvency of both the banks and the sovereign to intensify – hence 
the ‘doom loop’. Proponents of a European safe asset have argued that a common safe asset 
would encourage banks to replace their excessive domestic bond holdings with the European 
asset, increasing diversification and lowering risk within the financial system.8
While these two points comprise the most common and fundamental arguments for a Eu-
ropean safe asset, proponents have also listed a range of other potential benefits, including 
improved monetary policy transmission; cultivation of an area-wide liquidity premium result-
ing in overall lower costs of borrowing in the Euro area; increased fiscal discipline through the 
introduction of additional budgetary surveillance measures to accompany such an asset; and 
addressing a perceived shortage of safe assets within the Euro area.9
6. Bank for International Settlements, ‘discussion Paper: The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures’, 2017.
7. Schneider, yannik M., and Sascha Steffan, ‘Feasibility Check: Transition to a New Regime for Bank Sovereign Exposure?’, European 
Parliament, 2017
8. Brunnermeier et al., 2017; Claessens, Stijn, Ashoka Mody, and Shahin Vallee, ‘Paths to Eurobonds’, Bruegel, 2012; ESRB HLTF, 2018. 
9. See, for example: claessens et al, 2012; van Riet, 2017; gabor, daniela, and Jakob Vestergaard, ‘chasing Unicorns: The European 
Single Safe Asset Project’, competition and change, 22 (2018). 
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1.3 types of safe asset proposals since the financial crisis
While calls for a common European debt instrument pre-date the Euro crisis,10 it was only after 
the onset of the crisis in late 2009 that safe asset proposals gained momentum as poten-
tial tools for the prevention and management of financial crises. The main proposals, which 
emerged mostly between the period of 2009 and 2012, had substantial differences in key 
design elements and consequences. While other authors have compared and classified safe 
asset proposals in different ways,11 we can consider safe asset proposals as belonging to 
three broad groups:
•  Proposals that create European-level safe assets through pooling sovereign bonds;
•  Proposals that aim to make national bonds safer; and
•  Proposals that create European-level safe assets for European institutions.
Proposals within each of these three groups can then be further differentiated by the extent 
to which they formally imply joint liability among Euro area members, i.e. the extent to which 
Euro area members would be held liable for other members’ debt obligations. Figure 2 shows 
the relative orientation of the some of the most prominent safe asset proposals since the Euro 
crisis, which are then described in detail below.
fiGUre 2 ▪ common safe asset proposals, compared
10. See e.g. European Primary dealers Association, 2008; giovannini group, 2000. 
11. See e.g. claessens et al., 2012; Leandro, Alvaro, and Jeromin zettelmeyer, ‘The Search for a Euro Area Safe Asset’, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 2018. 
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european-level safe assets created through pooling national bonds
These proposals aim to pool sovereign bonds in some form to create a new, European-level 
safe asset. These are the proposals most readily identifiable as ‘safe asset proposals’ and 
form the focus of this paper. Chronologically, these begin with classical Eurobonds featuring 
full joint and several liability of Euro area debt and have trended towards involving less and less 
joint liability over time, culminating in the SBBS/ESBies proposal which, in principle at least, 
does not require joint liability at all. These are described briefly below.
‘Classical’ Eurobonds
The first ‘classical’ Eurobond proposals were put forward at about the same time in 2009 
by Gros and Micossi12 and de Grauwe and Moesen13 with the aim to reduce fragmenta-
tion between national bond markets in the Euro area. The more detailed proposal consist-
ed of a straightforward pooling of government debt through the issuance of a common 
‘Eurobond’ with joint and several liability by a public issuing authority at the European or 
national level. Several variations on the Eurobond concept were then put forward over the 
following years to address the perceived moral hazard or adverse incentive problems of 
classical Eurobonds.
Blue/Red Bonds
One of the most influential variations on the Eurobond concept was the Blue/Red Bond pro-
posal put forward in 2010 by Delpla and von Weizsäcker at Bruegel.14 Under the Blue/Red 
Bond proposal, governments could issue debt worth up to 60% of their GDP in the form of 
common European ‘Blue Bonds’, which would enjoy a joint and several guarantee by all par-
ticipating states. Debt in excess of 60% of GDP would be issued in the form of national ‘Red 
Bonds’, which would not enjoy a joint or several guarantee and therefore be subject to a higher 
interest rate and default risk. This would act as an incentive to keep debt below the 60% thresh-
old and thereby address one of the key criticisms of the original Eurobond proposal (namely, 
that it would encourage excessive borrowing).
Eurobills
Under a proposal made by Philippon and Hellwig in 2011,15 a European debt management 
office (DMO) would issue jointly and severally guaranteed ‘Eurobills’ for Member States, which 
would be similar to Eurobonds but with a maximum maturity of one year and an issuance cap 
for any individual state at 10% of GDP in order to prevent excess borrowing. Eurobills would 
also be granted senior status over national debt.
Stability Bonds
Stability Bonds were a set of three options for the joint issuance of debt proposed by the 
European Commission in 2011 and 2012. These included either full or partial European substi-
tution of national issuance with joint and several guarantees, or partial European substitution 
12. gros, daniel, and Stefano Micossi, ‘A Bond-Issuing EU Stability Fund could Rescue Europe’, Friends of Europe, 2009.
13. De Grauwe, Paul, and Wim Moesen, ‘gains for All: A Proposal for a common Eurobond, centre for European Policy Studies’, 2009 
14. delpla, Jacques, and Jakob Von weizsäcker, ‘The Blue Bond Proposal’, Bruegel, 2010.
15. Philippon, Thomas, and Christian Hellwig, ‘Eurobills, Not Eurobonds’, VoX: cEPR’s Policy Portal, 2011 
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of national issuance with several but not joint guarantees. The Commission released a Green 
Paper on Stability Bonds in 2011, but the proposal was not pursued further. 
European Safe Bonds (ESBies) / Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBS)
European Safe Bonds (ESBies), also referred to by some as ‘synthetic Eurobonds’, were pro-
posed by the Euro-nomics Group of economists in 2011 as a method of creating a European 
safe asset without debt mutualisation or joint liability.16 Under the ESBies proposal, a public 
or private special purpose vehicle would purchase a portfolio of national government bonds 
and issue common securities in the form of a senior tranche (ESBies) and a junior tranche 
(European Junior Bonds, or EJBies). The safety of the ESB would derive from the combination 
of diversification and tranching. ESBies have since been rebranded as Sovereign Bond-Backed 
Securities (SBBS) and were the subject of the European Systemic Risk Board’s High-Level Task 
Force on Safe Assets. On the basis of the Task Force results, the European Commission then 
put forward a proposal to ease the regulatory framework for SBBS in May 2018.17 Interviewed 
officials at the national and European levels indicated that SBBS/ESBies are by far the safe 
asset proposal that has been considered most seriously by policymakers and economists.
proposals to make national bonds safer
Unlike the first group, these proposals are not as readily classified as belonging to the family 
of ‘safe asset proposals’. These proposals are not primarily concerned with creating a new, 
permanent safe asset at the European level as the first group were, but rather with increasing 
the safety of national bonds. 
Debt Redemption Pact
The Debt Redemption Pact was proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts in 
2011.18 Under this proposal, all national debt over 60% of GDP would be mutualised at the 
European level in exchange for a program of strict conditionality and austerity for the indebted 
countries. In this respect, the Debt Redemption Pact could have been classified within the first 
group of safe asset proposals, as it pools national debt to create a European-level asset sub-
ject to joint liability. However, the program was strictly intended to be a temporary, ‘one-time’ 
deal with a clear end-point, as all countries would be required under the proposal to reduce 
their debt to under 60% of GDP within 25 years. The primary intent of the Debt Redemption 
Pact was therefore not to create a lasting European-level safe asset but to reduce and main-
tain national debt at a sustainable level.
Accountability Bonds
The Accountability Bonds proposal by Fuest, Heinemann and Schröder (2015) suggested that 
a mandatory junior bond be introduced at the national level for any excess debt issued after 
16. Brunnermeier, Markus, Luis garicano, Philip R Lane, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, and Tano Santos, ‘European Safe Bonds (ESBies)’, 
The Euro-Nomics group, 2012. 
17. See website of the European Commission. 
18. Bofinger, Peter, Lars Feld, Wolfgang Franz, Christoph Schmidt, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, ‘A European Redemption Pact’,  
VoX: cEPR’s Policy Portal, 2011. 
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a country exceeds the structural budget deficit of 0.5% as specified in the Fiscal Compact.19 
Accountability Bonds would lose their value if the issuing country receives assistance through 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and be subject to additional restrictions as well. 
The subordination of excess debt in the form of Accountability Bonds acts to ensure that the 
remaining ‘standard’ government bonds are safer.
National Tranching
National tranching was proposed in 2015 by Wendorff and Mahle with a similar approach to 
that of Accountability Bonds; namely, that national governments would issue their sovereign 
debt in senior and junior tranches, preserving the safety of the senior tranche.20 Unlike Ac-
countability Bonds, the issuance of junior bonds would not be linked to a structural budget 
deficit but based on a pre-determined ratio of senior to junior bonds (e.g. 70/30) to be applied 
to all newly-issued debt.
european-level safe assets for european institutions
The third group of safe asset proposals consider that a European-level safe asset need not 
be based on national government bonds, but could emerge at the European level as part of a 
borrowing capacity for a European budget or for European institutions. 
Common European Budget
The idea of introducing a fiscal capacity for the Euro area with the possibility of issuing its own 
debt in order to fund some form of stabilisation function is not new, and has recently seen a 
resurgence of interest under Emmanuel Macron.21 Under these proposals, bonds could be is-
sued directly at the European level. The debt would presumably be serviced either by Member 
State contributions or through a European tax. 
European Stability Mechanism & European Financial Stability Facility
As pointed out by interviewees, a European-level safe asset technically already exists in the 
case of bonds issued by the ESM and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which are 
guaranteed by Euro area Member States. The safety of ESM bonds is also ensured through the 
ESM’s preferred creditor status.
1.4 current state of the debate over a european safe asset
The place of a European safe asset within the Euro area reform agenda is not without contro-
versy. There has been significant debate among policymakers and economists as to whether 
a common safe asset is a necessary element of the reform agenda, with some arguing that 
on the contrary, certain so-called ‘safe’ asset proposals, particularly SBBS/ESBies, pose a con-
19. Fuest, clemens, Friedrich Heinemann, and christoph Schröder, ‘Accountability Bonds: Eine Neue Art von Staatsanleihen’, 
Ökonomenstimme, 2015. 
20. wendorff, Karsten, and Alexander Mahle, ‘Staatsanleihen Neu Ausgestalten – Für Eine Stabilitätsorientierte währungsunion’, 
wirtschaftsdienst, 95 (2015), 604–8. 
21. Leandro and zettelmeyer, 2018; Ubide, Angel, ‘Stability Bonds for the Euro Area’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015 
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siderable financial stability risk to the Euro area.22 Accordingly, the topic has disappeared and 
re-appeared a number of times in the debate over EMU reform. While common debt issuance 
was mentioned as a potential medium-term objective in the Four Presidents’ Report of 2012, 
the idea of a safe asset disappeared entirely from the roadmap set out three years later in the 
2015 Five Presidents’ Report, before re-emerging in the Commission’s 2017 Reflection Paper 
on the Deepening of the EMU.
In September 2016, the ESRB established a High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets in order to 
investigate the feasibility of introducing ESBies, now called SBBS. The Task Force concluded 
in its final report of January 2018 that ‘gradual development of a demand-led market for SBBS 
might be feasible under certain conditions.’23 A key question in the ESRB findings and in the 
broader debate over SBBS related to the regulatory treatment of such assets. Under the cur-
rent regime, SBBS would not enjoy the same zero risk weight afforded to individual sovereign 
bonds, but would instead be treated as riskier asset-backed securities (ABS), removing the 
primary incentive for banks to hold them. In May 2018, on the basis of the Task Force find-
ings, the European Commission therefore presented a proposal for an ‘enabling framework’ to 
afford SBBS the same regulatory treatment as individual sovereign bonds. However, this pro-
posal provoked controversy among national stakeholders and was curtly rejected in the joint 
reform agenda announced by France and Germany in Meseberg on 19 June 2018.
2 ▪ french and GerMan perspectives 
On a eUrOpean safe asset 
The rejection of the current leading safe asset proposal in the Franco-German roadmap un-
veiled at Meseberg is significant on the practical grounds that France and Germany are the 
two largest economies in the Euro area, and that their buy-in is essential for EMU reform. 
Historically, Franco-German cooperation has also been viewed as the ‘motor’ of European in-
tegration, and other authors have previously described how the present structure of the EMU 
reflects a long series of compromises (to varying degrees of asymmetry) between French and 
German policy preferences.24
At the same time, France and Germany still represent just two members out of nineteen in 
the Euro area. It is relevant to note, however, that others have argued prominently for under-
standing the ‘French’ and ‘German’ perspectives to be emblematic of competing economic 
philosophies or perspectives (Weltanschauungen) within the Euro area as a whole,25 with Ger-
22. For a notable example, see the Letter from the chief Economist at the german Federal Ministry of Finance dated 23 November 2017
23. ESRB HLTF 2018, 2. 
24. See e.g. Brunnermeier et al, 2016; Maes, Ivo, ‘on the origins of the Franco-german EMU controversies’, National Bank of Belgium, 
2002; Mourlon-druol, Emmanuel, Rethinking Franco-german Relations: ‘A Historical Perspective, Bruegel, 2017; Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 
‘Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on the Debate over the Economic Governance of the Euro Area’, Journal of 
common Market Studies, 44 (2006), 823-44 
25. See e.g. Brunnermeier et al, 2016; Gros, Daniel, Daniela Schwarzer, Wolfgang Glomb, Lars P. Feld, Wolf Heinrich Reuter, Mustafa 
yeter, et al., ‘Frankreich Und Deutschland — Starke Partner Für Ein Stabiles Europa?’, wirtschaftsdienst, 98 (2018), 79–99;  
Hacker, Björn, and Cédric M. Koch, ‘The Divided Eurozone: Mapping Conflicting Interests on the Reform of the Monetary Union’,  
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017. 
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many representing the perspective of the ‘North’ (including e.g. the Netherlands, Finland, and 
the Baltic states) and France, at least some of the time, representing the ‘South’ (including e.g. 
Italy and Spain).26 To the extent that this reflects real policy allegiances,27 understanding the 
underlying disagreements that shape French and German policy preferences can therefore 
provide insights on broader philosophical debates on the future of the Euro area.
In order to better understand the debate between French and German perspectives on safe 
assets, structured research interviews were conducted between March and May of 2018 
with 21 high-level (mostly technocratic) officials in both countries from key economic, fis-
cal, and monetary institutions, including various branches of the respective Ministries of 
Finance, central banks, financial regulators and debt management organisations. Interviews 
were also conducted with academic experts and market actors in both countries as well as 
with European Central Bank officials involved in the High-Level Task Force at the European 
Systemic Risk Board. The analysis in the following sections of this paper is based on the 
results of these interviews.
2.1 Understanding policy disagreements between france and Germany
Neither the French nor the German policymakers interviewed were particularly keen on a Eu-
ropean safe asset proposal, but for very different reasons. However, before proceeding to a 
discussion of French and German perspectives on safe assets, it may help to first provide a 
framework for understanding the roots of the disagreements between French and German 
policymakers on safe assets in particular and economic policy in general. 
Briefly, the disagreements between France and Germany on economic policy matters can be 
sorted into differences in beliefs, values and interests. 
beliefs and values
Differences in beliefs and values are deeply interlinked: beliefs about how the world works, or 
more specifically about how the economy works, shape social values regarding what is fair or 
just, and vice versa. Building on previous research into French and German policy positions,28 
the key differences between France and Germany in terms of beliefs about the economy are 
summarised in Table 1.
26. This classification is necessarily a simplification. Both Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Hacker & Koch (2017) argue that France 
rather plays the role of an ‘in-between’ state that exhibits both ‘North’ and ‘South’ characteristics. Nonetheless, both sets of authors 
place it closer to the ‘South’ point of view than to Germany in debates over EMU reform. 
27. See e.g. Hacker & Koch (2017), who analyse position papers on Euro area reform submitted in advance of the Five Presidents’ 
Report and find that Euro area members can be sorted into two likeminded groups, one centred around Germany and the other centred 
around France. 
28. Notably Brunnermeier et al (2016). 
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table 1 ▪ key differences in economic beliefs between Germany and france
 DE FR
Economic crises result 
principally from…
Underlying problems of solvency due to 
irresponsible practices in public finance
Temporary problems of liquidity worsened 
in situations of financial instability
Policy responses 
to economic crises 
should focus on…
Ex-ante risk reduction and crisis 
prevention in the long-term
Ex-post problem-solving and 
crisis management in the 
short- to medium-term
Policy responses 
should be based on 
the principle of…
Individual liability Solidarity
The framework of the 
EMU should ideally 
be based on…
States adhering to binding rules
States being free to exercise 
policy discretion
Both perspectives are internally coherent, but based on different economic worldviews, i.e. dif-
ferent understandings of how economics works. The points above show how each side sees 
different underlying problems, builds different crisis narratives, and prescribes different solu-
tions that make sense within the context of their own worldview, but not necessarily within the 
worldview of the other. While the German narrative considers that the Euro crisis is the result 
of poor public finances and prescribes stricter enforcement of existing fiscal rules and mar-
ket discipline to bring domestic policies in line, the French narrative considers that the Euro 
crisis resulted from financial instability problems aggravated by gaps in the economic govern-
ance of the Euro area, for which the logical solution is more coordination, more flexibility, and 
more risk-sharing at the European level. While these beliefs are obviously not held uniformly 
by either party – plenty of French interviewees emphasised rules and market discipline while 
several German interviewees emphasised solidarity – the interview results do show that each 
perspective is clearly dominant within its respective country.
Bridging this gap between the French and German perspectives was the aim of a group of 14 
French and German economists who published a joint policy paper in early 2018 calling for 
reconciliation between the risk-sharing focus of France and the market discipline focus of Ger-
many, arguing that these should be viewed as complementary rather than mutually-exclusive 
solutions.29 One of the factors hindering a full reconciliation, however, is the fact that these 
worldviews are also bound up with a system of values that are coherent within but not neces-
sarily across the different perspectives. Designing economic policies around the principle of 
individual liability versus solidarity is one example of a belief that also implies different values 
regarding what would be ‘fair’ or ‘right’ in a policy response. Additionally, differing narratives of 
the financial crisis as either a fundamental problem of financial instability (value-neutral) or of 
irresponsible spending (value-based) also show how a policy issue may be viewed as merely 
a technical problem to be solved in one country (France), while being viewed as a violation of 
deeply-held social values in the other (Germany). 
29. Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Markus Brunnermeier, Henrik Enderlein, Emmanuel Farhi, Lars Feld, Marcel Fratzscher, et al., ‘Reconciling 
Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform’, centre for Economic Policy Research, 2018. 
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interests
In addition to beliefs and values, France and Germany also have diverging political and econom-
ic interests which are specific to the safe asset case. As the issuer of the Euro area’s current 
de facto safe asset, Germany stands to lose the safe haven premium from which it currently 
benefits and would likely be subject to higher borrowing costs if a European-level safe asset 
were introduced. However, this does not necessarily mean that Germany stands to lose the 
most from the introduction of a European safe asset. French sovereign debt has an AA rating 
and is not far behind Germany in terms of the perception of its ‘safety’; nonetheless, as France 
experienced much more volatility in its sovereign bond yields during the Euro crisis, the effects 
of introducing a European safe asset could potentially carry more risk for the French sovereign 
bond market than for the German market. On the other hand, German interviewees considered 
that their country would inevitably be called upon to provide a bailout or guarantee for a Euro-
pean safe asset if it were to fail. In short, Germany faces a number of unique economic disin-
centives to introduce a European safe asset, while France may have reason to harbour some 
reservations related to the uncertain effects of the asset on national sovereign bond markets.
2.2 principle areas of disagreement
The interview results are clear in showing that French and German policymakers tend to view 
European safe asset proposals through the ‘lens’ of either financial stabilisation or market dis-
cipline, and that this lens shapes how policymakers in each country perceive and assess the 
problems, solutions, costs, and benefits. The following sections examine these differences in 
detail, before discussing how these worldviews come together in practice.
engagement with safe asset proposals
French and German policymakers engage with safe asset proposals differently, according to 
their values and interests. This is most evident in the extent to which institutions have taken 
sides in the debate: while almost all of the French interviewees emphasised that their institu-
tion did not have an official position on the topic, none of the German interviewees claimed the 
same, with some explicitly stating that their institution was not in favour of the most recent 
proposals. Interviewees in both countries considered that the German position on safe as-
sets was firmer than the French position.
Differences also exist in the intensity with which policymakers reported working on safe asset 
proposals and the weight that they assigned to the topic. In Germany, the recent SBBS proposals 
were referred to as a ‘fundamental’ issue and had reportedly been subject to intense discussion 
at a very high level. In France, however, while the issue was clearly being followed and there had 
been high-level discussion, none of the officials interviewed characterised safe assets as a criti-
cal issue, with most stressing that their attention was focused on other reform efforts. 
perceived costs and benefits
Policymakers in France and Germany differ not just in the types of costs and benefits they 
associate with a European safe asset, but also in how they assess the costs and benefits, re-
flecting the key elements of their respective worldviews – namely, a focus on financial stability 
vs. market discipline – and the extent to which they see the issues as technical/value-neutral 
or as more fundamental.
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In France
French policymakers considered costs and benefits primarily with respect to the effectiveness 
of the proposals. There was no unique ‘French perspective’ on safe assets, although French 
interviewees tended to adopt one of two main approaches: 
•  A technical approach, focusing on the technical merits of safe asset proposals and 
weighing possible benefits against costs and risks; or
•  A problem-focused approach, focusing on the policy rationale for a European-level 
safe asset and questioning whether it was the best tool to solve the problems 
at hand.
Interviewees taking the technical approach generated a long list of potential benefits, but an 
equally long list of potential costs and risks, with a focus on the theme of financial stability 
(Table 2). They tended to be open to and interested in a European safe asset but questioned 
how well the proposals would ‘work’ in a technical sense, especially in a crisis scenario. Their 
key concerns were that the asset might have a distortionary effect on national bond markets 
(including a risk of increased fragmentation), that it might not be sufficiently liquid, and that 
there might be a lack of market interest in the new asset.
table 2 ▪ benefits and costs/risks of a european safe asset as indicated by french interviewees
BENEFITS COSTS OR RISkS
•  Breaking the bank-sovereign nexus by diluting 
the domestic bias and breaking the doom loop
•  Avoiding destabilising capital flows by 
limiting effects from the flight to safety
•  Increasing the supply of Euro-denominated 
safe assets (for collateral etc.)
•  Improving transmission of monetary policy 
(easier to implement quantitative easing)
•  Building a crisis-resilient framework for 
economic governance in the future
•  Negative or uncertain effects on national 
bond markets (e.g. a reduction in liquidity)
•  Increased fragmentation in national bond 
markets (e.g. by crowding out periphery 
countries not included in the safe asset)
•  Illiquidity of the ‘safe’ asset 
(especially in a new market)
•  Lack of market interest (i.e. an SBBS might 
be seen as too complex or not safe enough)
•  Concerns regarding effects on market 
discipline for issuing governments
The French interviewees subscribing to the ‘problem-focused’ perspective, in contrast, began 
from a more sceptical basis by critically examining the safe asset concept and its policy ra-
tionale at the European level. Interviewees in this group considered that increasing financial 
stability was the primary problem that a European safe asset aimed to solve and questioned 
whether it would be the best tool to accomplish that objective, citing some of the same risks 
identified by the first group and pointing out that there were many other proposals (e.g. a Euro 
area budget, bank concentration charges) that could achieve similar results with fewer risks 
and costs. These interviewees also questioned the political feasibility of a European safe asset 
and tended to see pooling sovereign debt in any form as an extreme political step which would 
require justification and evidence that in their view was currently insufficient.
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In Germany
German policymakers were more uniform in their assessment of the costs and benefits. While 
some interviewees considered that there could be benefits from a European safe asset in 
theory – such as breaking the bank-sovereign nexus, preventing destabilising capital flows, 
lowering financing costs in the Euro area, and possibly lowering the cost of sovereign debt 
restructuring (the last of which was not noted by any of the French interviewees) – the German 
perspective tended to focus almost exclusively on the long-run costs and risks. 
Only a couple of interviewees mentioned in passing that a European safe asset would increase 
borrowing costs for Germany. The dominant concern among German policymakers instead 
related to moral hazard and adverse incentive problems, i.e. that a European safe asset would 
reduce market discipline, encourage countries to borrow more irresponsibly at a lower cost, 
and transfer greater credit risk to the European level, thereby increasing rather than decreasing 
Euro area financial instability and inevitably requiring a bailout. In this context, almost none of 
the German interviewees believed that the claim of SBBS to avoid joint liability via financial 
engineering was credible. Most considered that SBBS would carry an implicit guarantee of 
European or national support, a perception that would only be strengthened if the Commis-
sion followed through with its plans to adapt European banking regulations to give preferential 
treatment to SBBS. 
In sum, policymakers in France focused on the relative effectiveness of a safe asset in 
addressing financial stability, while the discussion in Germany focused almost exclusively 
on costs and risks associated with moral hazard or adverse incentive problems. Where fi-
nancial stability concerns were discussed in Germany, these tended to be viewed through the 
lens of moral hazard, with interviewees arguing that safe asset proposals provided the wrong 
incentives and were likely to decrease financial stability in the long run. In both countries, 
significant doubts were expressed about whether an SBBS would qualify as a truly ‘safe’ (i.e. 
crisis-resistant) asset, although in France this fear tended to relate to the technical properties 
of the asset whereas in Germany this fear was more directly linked to irresponsible borrowing.
perspectives on various safe asset proposals
In France
The positions of French policymakers towards a European safe asset have changed consider-
ably over time, depending on the policy trade-offs present at any given point. Interviewees con-
sidered that Eurobond-type proposals were quite popular in France at a theoretical level early on 
in the Euro crisis, but fell out of vogue around 2012 with the introduction of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) by the ECB and the establishment of the ESM, which removed much of 
the pressure on bond markets and consequently made safe asset proposals less attractive to 
policymakers. While there has been interest in the new SBBS proposals, French policymakers 
remain sceptical of the net benefits and do not consider SBBS to be a ‘game-changer’ or ‘silver 
bullet’ for the problems faced by the Euro area, especially given the other policy options available.
The question of joint liability proved highly divisive in France, with some policymakers identi-
fying it as the key question in the safe asset debate. Some remained strongly in favour of a 
Eurobond-type safe asset with joint liability, assuming that the appropriate fiscal accountabil-
ity mechanisms were in place, while others were just as strongly opposed, arguing that joint 
liability was out of scope in the present political climate. The divisiveness of the joint liability 
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question spilled over into a particular criticism of SBBS made by some French interviewees, 
namely that it appeared custom-designed to avoid fundamental and inherently political choic-
es about the future of the Euro area. In this light, some interviewees argued that SBBS were 
disingenuous, and that the question of joint liability should be settled explicitly and politically 
rather than being avoided or hidden through financial engineering.
In Germany
Attitudes toward safe asset proposals in Germany were more uniform and consistent over time 
than in France. Interviewees emphasised that all of the proposals suffered from similar moral haz-
ard and adverse incentive problems to some degree, and that their perspective on these proposals 
had not changed over time (an observation that was confirmed by the French interviewees).
Most German interviewees rejected joint liability outright on the grounds that this would be 
incompatible with German and European law, and would impose adverse incentives for coun-
tries to borrow irresponsibly. Given their concerns over the joint liability question, policymakers 
were not just opposed to the original Eurobond-type proposals, but were also sceptical of 
SBBS, which they viewed as carrying an implicit guarantee and therefore de facto joint liability. 
A common criticism therefore referred to SBBS as ‘Eurobonds through the backdoor’ or ‘back-
door mutualisation’. Like their French counterparts, some German interviewees considered 
that SBBS were simply not transparent enough or targeted enough for what they were trying 
to accomplish. 
Policymakers in both countries therefore emphasised that the design of a European safe 
asset was not just a technical question, but reflected decisions that were inherently politi-
cal, with joint liability singled out as the key question to be resolved.
conditions and forward-looking perspectives
When asked to list conditions under which a safe asset proposal would be acceptable, French 
responses were again more heterogeneous than those in Germany, to the extent that some 
French interviewees disagreed on fundamental questions or proposed conflicting conditions. 
Interviewees in Germany tended not to contradict each other but instead showed a coherent 
focus on avoiding adverse incentives. Key points of contention related to the level of joint lia-
bility required as well as the appropriate regulatory treatment for the European-level asset.
In France
French policymakers focused on conditions around the effectiveness of the proposal, ensur-
ing that the expected benefits would be achieved while minimising possible costs and risks. 
On the question of joint liability and debt mutualisation, policymakers were torn. Some con-
sidered that a common asset without joint liability would lack market credibility, while others 
argued that joint liability would never be politically acceptable. 
On the question of regulatory treatment, French policymakers were nearly unanimous that the 
safe asset would need to benefit from the same zero risk weight as national bonds to be viable 
on the market. However, there was disagreement as to whether this regulatory privileging of the 
safe asset would need to be accompanied by removing the zero risk weight for national bonds, 
which some perceived to be necessary and others perceived to be politically out of bounds.
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French policymakers agreed that any safe asset proposal would need to maintain market dis-
cipline. A key concern in France was also the need to minimise distortion of national bond 
markets, and in particular to ensure continued liquidity in primary government bond markets, 
implying that a European safe asset should not significantly raise French borrowing costs. 
Finally, French policymakers expressed that they needed to be convinced that a safe asset 
proposal would actually solve the problems they face, and that there would not be a simpler or 
more politically feasible solution available that could achieve the same results.
In Germany
German policymakers placed significant emphasis on avoiding moral hazard and ensuring 
that any proposal promoted the correct incentives. Accordingly:
On the question of joint liability and debt mutualisation, no debt mutualisation was considered 
a basic condition of any proposal. Concerning SBBS in particular, most interviewees were con-
cerned about not giving the appearance of an explicit or implicit guarantee. However, some 
interviewees who were more sympathetic to the concept framed the discussion in terms of 
balancing financial stability objectives and lower financing costs for Euro area countries on the 
one side with fiscal responsibility and proper incentives on the other. They emphasised that 
this balance would need to be built into the design of a safe asset – e.g. through a two-tiered 
structure with both a safe and non-safe component (e.g. Blue/Red Bonds or EJBies/ESBies) 
to preserve market signals. 
On the question of regulatory treatment, the notion of regulatory privilege was a key source of 
controversy. Almost all German policymakers interviewed were in favour of removing the zero 
risk weight for national debt, which they considered to be out of line with the economic reality. 
However, there was disagreement as to whether the European safe asset should receive the 
privilege of a zero risk weight. While a limited number of interviewees considered that the sen-
ior tranche of a SBBS could be granted a zero risk weight if it were truly safe, most considered 
this inappropriate. They argued that a SBBS was not a ‘safe’ asset or that giving it regulatory 
privilege (especially if the zero risk weight were removed for national bonds) would be inter-
preted by the market as an implicit European bailout guarantee.
Some German policymakers also argued that access to the European safe asset by individ-
ual Member States would have to be limited and contingent on the observation of EU fiscal 
rules. Given these limitations, some interviewees commented that only a private, market-led 
synthetic bond like an SBBS without any regulatory privilege would be acceptable from their 
perspective.
Neither French nor German policymakers were particularly optimistic about the possibility 
of introducing a European safe asset in the near future; they were also sceptical that such an 
asset, if introduced, could achieve a high enough trading volume to be effective. Policymakers 
in both countries pointed towards other Euro area reform proposals as more fruitful areas for 
cooperation, although this point given more weight in France than in Germany. Policymakers 
in both countries considered the current situation in the Euro area to be unsustainable, but 
disagreed about the next steps, with French policymakers tending to emphasise the need for 
more stabilisation instruments at the European level and German policymakers tending to 
emphasise the need for more credible fiscal rules.
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2.3 policy cooperation in practice
Given the differences in economic worldviews, it may be hard to picture how the French and 
German perspectives described above come together in practice – and yet they do. France 
and Germany cooperate on Euro area economic policy not just in multilateral European fo-
rums such as the Eurogroup, the ESRB or the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOF-
IN), but also in extensive bilateral dialogue through both formal and informal channels. Poli-
cymakers in both countries had a very positive perception of this bilateral cooperation, and 
emphasised that France and Germany usually try to arrive at a common position on Euro 
area governance topics. While disagreements often arise between the parties, it was noted 
that this was not due to a lack of understanding of the other’s position, but rather to disagree-
ments over the nature of the problem.
This observation emerges clearly in the safe asset case. Despite reporting that most cooper-
ation on this topic had come through multilateral rather than bilateral channels, policymakers 
in France and Germany both had a very accurate understanding of the position, reasoning, 
and main points of contention on the ‘other side’. Interviewees were often quick to point out 
that the French perspective emphasised financial stabilisation while the German perspective 
emphasised market discipline, or that French policymakers were more open to safe asset pro-
posals yet unconvinced by the merits while German policymakers tended to be more straight-
forwardly opposed. Despite being cognizant of these differences, however, interviewees on 
both sides concluded that the parties were not so far apart in terms of the end result – i.e., that 
neither was particularly enthusiastic about a European-level safe asset.
This seeming agreement on the end result may not be as neutral as it appears. There is some 
evidence to suggest that there has been policy convergence away from a safe asset, with 
France being pulled closer towards the German point of view. This point was made explic-
itly on the German side, with one interviewee considering that their French counterparts had 
become more sceptical towards SBBS over time as a result of German efforts by the Ger-
man side to convince them of problems with the proposal. Evidence for policy convergence 
towards the German point of view was also implicit in the choice of argumentation: French 
interviewees occasionally cited arguments made to them by their German counterparts as 
reasons for why certain proposals or policy options would be feasible or not; conversely, while 
German interviewees were all aware of the arguments made by their French colleagues, they 
did not cite these arguments as grounds for their own assessments.
cOnclUsiOn
France and Germany clearly rejected SBBS in the joint roadmap for Euro area reform present-
ed at Meseberg in June 2018. Nevertheless, this apparent agreement masks much deeper 
divisions in economic worldviews which have shaped the debate over Euro area reform up to 
this point and which will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. An inherent difficulty in 
overcoming these divisions is that each side sees the problems differently – or rather, sees 
different problems – and proposes solutions that make sense within their perspective, but 
which may not make sense within the other. Further complicating the reconciliation between 
these worldviews is the fact that these perspectives are also bound up in strongly-held values 
as well as specific economic and political interests.
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This is well-illustrated in the case of a European safe asset and particularly with respect to the 
SBBS proposal, which is assessed here from two different points of view. In France, the debate 
over SBBS is varied, technical, and focused on determining whether SBBS could be effective and 
whether it is the right tool to improve financial stability in the Euro area given the present policy 
trade-offs. In Germany, the assessment is more uniform, more straightforward, more consistent 
over time, and closely linked with values: German policymakers consider that SBBS under cur-
rent conditions would be a moral hazard risk, do not believe it would be crisis-resistant in the long 
run, and suspect that such an asset would require an eventual bailout. The difference between 
the two countries could be summarised by stating that while most French policymakers are 
not opposed to a European safe asset in principle, most German policymakers are opposed 
to a European safe asset almost entirely in principle. This may be one reason for why there 
appears to have been French convergence towards the German position but not vice versa.
Despite the rejection by France and Germany at Meseberg, the topic of a common European safe 
asset is unlikely to disappear from discussions over Euro area reform. Safe asset proposals as a 
whole continue to attract interest from policymakers and have strong proponents who argue that a 
common safe asset is a necessary or inevitable piece of the EMU. The main points of contention that 
remain to be resolved for the issue to move forward, at least as far as the debate in France and Ger-
many illustrates, are the degree of joint liability that would be acceptable or necessary for the proposal 
to work, the regulatory treatment of the safe asset (tied up with the issue of the regulatory treatment 
of sovereign exposures in general), and the design of the safe asset to ensure that market discipline 
is preserved. However, given the observed scepticism in the two largest economies of the Euro area, 
it would be difficult for a European safe asset to secure a high place on the reform agenda at present.
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